Ambassador Zhang Xiangchen

主席先生，

Mr. Chairman.

剛才，美國(guó)謝伊大使的發(fā)言，一下子讓總理事會(huì)變得火藥味十足。我們應(yīng)該感謝他，是他提醒我們現(xiàn)在處于多邊貿(mào)易體制的空前危機(jī)當(dāng)中，大家不能再悠閑地坐在湖畔享受夏日微風(fēng)了。我特別要感謝他，7 月 13 日就把美國(guó)擬提交的《中國(guó)貿(mào)易破壞性的經(jīng)濟(jì)模式》文件發(fā)給我，使我能夠提前消化它。但遺憾的是，這并非是什么佳肴美饌，而是味同嚼蠟。

The remarks by the US Ambassador Shea moment ago have made the air smell like gunpowder in this Council room. We should thank Ambassador Shea, as he reminded us that we are now in an unprecedented crisis of the multilateral trading system, and we can no longer sit leisurely by the lakeside, enjoying the sunshine and summer breeze. I would  like  to thank Ambassador Shea in particular for sending me a copy of the US submission on China’s Trade-Disruptive Economic Model on 13 July, so that I can digest this heavy cake before I come to this meeting. But much to my disappointment, that to me, it tastes more like a half-cooked dough than a cake.

我該如何回應(yīng)呢？貿(mào)易政策審議是成員間相互評(píng)估貿(mào)易政策的機(jī)制，世貿(mào)組織第 7 次對(duì)華貿(mào)易政策審議剛剛結(jié)束，我的同事王受文副部長(zhǎng)已經(jīng)回答了美國(guó)文件中的很多問(wèn)題。如果有人愿意在別的機(jī)制下批評(píng)其他成員的貿(mào)易政策，我不持異議。你若意猶未盡，我愿洗耳恭聽(tīng)。盡管我不認(rèn)為世貿(mào)組織是討論成員經(jīng)濟(jì)模式的恰當(dāng)場(chǎng)所，我還是選擇不阻攔總理事會(huì)議程的通過(guò)，阻礙正常程序使一個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)不能正常運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)， 那不是中國(guó)人的行事風(fēng)格。

Then, how should I respond? As a matter of  fact, the  Trade Policy Review is a collective appreciation and evaluation of Members’ trade policy and practices. Two weeks ago, we have just finished the 7th Trade Policy Review of China, during which my colleague, Vice-Minister Wang Shouwen has answered quite many questions including those showed up in  the US paper. Should any Members wish to criticize other Members' trade policy under other mechanism, I have no objection. If you feel like having more to say, I am then  all  ears. Although I do not believe the WTO is the appropriate place to discuss the economic models of Members, I chose not to block the adoption of this agenda item at today’s meeting of the General Council. Because  blocking  the  normal proceedings and forcing a WTO body out of operation is definitely not our way of doing things.

針對(duì)美國(guó)文件里的指責(zé)，我完全可以重申中方在審議中的立場(chǎng)：中國(guó)的國(guó)有企業(yè)是自主經(jīng)營(yíng)自負(fù)盈虧的市場(chǎng)主體，產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩的根本原因是金融危機(jī)造成的需求收縮，中國(guó)沒(méi)有強(qiáng)制性技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓的法律規(guī)定，中國(guó)的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策是指導(dǎo)性的，中國(guó)嚴(yán)格履行了入世承諾，中國(guó)執(zhí)行了所有爭(zhēng)端解決的裁決，中國(guó)的發(fā)展惠及世界，作為發(fā)展中國(guó)家的中國(guó)在解決發(fā)展不平衡不充分方面依然任重道遠(yuǎn)，等等，然后打烊收工。但是這樣做好像有些對(duì)不住那些起草文件的美國(guó)同事，他們畢竟花了不少功夫。來(lái)而不往非禮也。美國(guó)文件長(zhǎng)達(dá)十幾頁(yè)，做出回應(yīng)大約需要 30 分鐘。我一向不愿意作冗長(zhǎng)發(fā)言，但今天懇請(qǐng)大家諒解。

In response to those charges raised by the US in its paper, I can reiterate what China has stated in our trade policy review,that is, the state-owned enterprises in China are market entities, carrying out autonomous operation and assuming sole responsibility for profits or losses; the root cause for overcapacity is contraction of global demand following the financial crisis; China has no legal provisions that impose compulsory requirements on technology transfer; the industrial policies in China are guidance in nature; China has strictly abided by its WTO accession commitments and implemented all dispute settlement rulings; China’s development has benefited the whole world; as a developing country, China still has a long way to go in terms of achieving comprehensive and balanced development and etc.  I can go on elaborating all these  facts  and we can call it a day at the meeting. But for me, this might seem a bit unfair to our US colleagues who have spent many hours in drafting this paper. As we say, it is impolite not to reciprocate. The US submission has a dozen pages, to respond to it might take around 30 minutes. I never liked to make long interventions, but I’ll have to ask for your indulgence today.

對(duì)待批評(píng)，被批評(píng)者應(yīng)當(dāng)虛懷若谷，從善如流。不管批評(píng)意見(jiàn)多么尖銳，是否與事實(shí)相符，都應(yīng)本著有則改之無(wú)則加勉的精神來(lái)對(duì)待。我和我的同事之間經(jīng)常開(kāi)展批評(píng)和自我批評(píng)，請(qǐng)相信我有接受批評(píng)的氣量。

I believe there are some basic rules to follow both in terms of giving and receiving criticism. For those who receive criticism, they should have an open mind for any criticism and embrace those criticisms that are fair and just. This should be the case no matter how harsh the criticism is or how much factual it is. We should treat the criticism in the spirit of correcting mistakes if you have made any and guarding against them if you have not. Actually in my Mission we are oftenhaving criticism and self-criticism among our colleagues. So please rest assured that we do have enough courage and broad mind to receive criticisms.

批評(píng)者也應(yīng)當(dāng)遵守一些原則，比如，實(shí)事求是，不亂扣帽子，使用正確的事實(shí)和正確地使用事實(shí)，論據(jù)和結(jié)論之間要有清楚的邏輯關(guān)系。這樣的批評(píng)才容易讓人信服，才有可能產(chǎn)生好的效果。

To be fair, for those who give criticism, they should also abide by some basic principles. For example, criticism should  be based on facts, should refrain from putting labels on others, should use correct facts and correctly use facts, there should be clear logic in reaching conclusions through analyzing evidence. Only in this way, can criticism be convincing and produce good results.

可惜，美國(guó)的文件并沒(méi)有做到這些。我舉幾個(gè)例子： 

Unfortunately, the US paper seems to fall short of these principles. Let me just give you a few examples.

第一，把自己的想法當(dāng)作別人的立場(chǎng)甚至多邊規(guī)則。

First, regard one’s own views as others’ positions or even the multilateral rules.

1992 年，當(dāng)中國(guó)宣布建立社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)，我記得清清楚楚，就在旁邊的 RoomW會(huì)議廳，當(dāng)被問(wèn)及什么是社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)，中國(guó)代表回答，我們所說(shuō)的社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)就是中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)。26年過(guò)去了，我們從未改變過(guò)自己的觀點(diǎn)。至于有些人認(rèn)為中國(guó)加入世貿(mào)組織后會(huì)改旗易幟，那只是他們的一廂情愿而已。世界上市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)不只有一種模式，中國(guó)在努力探索符合中國(guó)國(guó)情的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)道路，并且已經(jīng)取得了巨大的成就，不管別人說(shuō)什么，我們都會(huì)堅(jiān)定不移地沿著這條道路走下去。

Back in 1992, when China announced that it would build a socialist market economy, right in the Room W, a question was posed to a Chinese delegate, that is, what is a socialist market economy? I clearly remember this delegate replying that the socialist market economy was the market economy under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. 26 years passed since then, we have never changed our position. As for those who speculated that China would change and move onto a different path upon its WTO accession, but that was just their wishful thinking. There are more than one model of market economy in this world. China has been vigorously exploring a road of market economy which suits China’s own national situation and circumstances, and we have made remarkable progress in this endeavor. Whatever others may say, we will march along this road unswervingly.

美國(guó)謝伊大使剛才使用了“中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的非市場(chǎng)性質(zhì)”的概念，然而翻遍世貿(mào)規(guī)則，我們找不到所謂“市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)”的定義。世界上也沒(méi)有一個(gè)放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)的“市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。世貿(mào)規(guī)則沒(méi)有賦予任何成員以這樣特殊的權(quán)利，把自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)模式作為“市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)”的樣板，一旦有哪個(gè)國(guó)家不肯照搬，就是“非市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)”。

In his remarks, Dennis mentioned the term “non-market nature of China’s economy”. However, we can't find the definition of “market economy” throughout the WTO rule book. There is no one-size-fits-all “market economy” standard in the world. The WTO rules never authorize any Member to use its own economic model as the template of “market economy”, and to accuse any other Member who would not copy it as a “non-market economy”.

如果說(shuō)“非市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)”這個(gè)議題還有什么意義的話，就是它再次提醒我們，還有成員，包括美國(guó)，不顧世貿(mào)規(guī)則和自身承諾，根據(jù)國(guó)內(nèi)法的所謂“市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，在反傾銷調(diào)查中對(duì)其他成員使用“替代國(guó)”做法。我愿借此機(jī)會(huì)再次敦促這些成員，“有約必守”，請(qǐng)履行你們17年前的承諾。

If there is any relevance in the topic of "non-market economy", it reminds us once again that there are certain Members, including US, who, disregarding the WTO rules and their own commitments, are still using the notorious “surrogate country” methodology in anti-dumping investigations according to the “market economy” standards of their domestic laws. I would like to take this opportunity to urge these Members once again, “pacta sunt servanda”. Please honor your commitments 17 years ago.

美方文件第1.5 段只引用了十八屆三中全會(huì)提出的“更好發(fā)揮政府作用”，卻故意漏掉了“使市場(chǎng)在資源配置中起決定性作用”的表述。而承認(rèn)市場(chǎng)在配置資源中的決定性作用，恰恰是中國(guó)和世貿(mào)組織成員開(kāi)展正常經(jīng)貿(mào)往來(lái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體制基礎(chǔ)。請(qǐng)讓我完整地引用十八屆三中全會(huì)這段話，“經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革是全面深化改革的重點(diǎn)，核心問(wèn)題是處理好政府和市場(chǎng)的關(guān)系，使市場(chǎng)在資源配置中起決定性作用和更好發(fā)揮政府作用。市場(chǎng)決定資源配置是市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的一般規(guī)律，健全社會(huì)主義經(jīng)濟(jì)體制必須遵循這條規(guī)律，著力解決市場(chǎng)體系不完善、政府干預(yù)過(guò)多和監(jiān)管不到位問(wèn)題?！?/span>

Paragraph 1.5 of the US paper partially quoted an expression from the Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee, that is, “the government plays its  role better”. The US paper intentionally omitted the rest part of sentence, which says “the market should play a decisive role in allocating resources”. In this regard, it is critically important to recognize the decisive role that market plays in allocating resources, as this is precisely the economic and institutional basis upon which China promotes its economic and trade relations with the WTO Members.  Please allow me to give you a full quote of the entire paragraph in the Communiqué. “Economic structural reform is the focus of deepening the reform comprehensively. The underlying issue is how to strike a balance between the role of the government and that of the market, and let the market play the decisive role in allocating resources and let the government play its functions better. It is a general rule of the market economy that the market decides the allocation of resources. We have to follow this rule when we improve the socialist market economy. We should work hard to address the problems of imperfections in the market system, too much government interference and poor oversight.”

同樣，美方文件前言部分引用《馬拉喀什宣言》時(shí)，只提及“基于開(kāi)放、市場(chǎng)導(dǎo)向的政策”，卻有意遺漏了“和基于烏拉圭回合協(xié)定和決定確定的承諾”。這后半句話至關(guān)重要，每個(gè)成員都有國(guó)內(nèi)的政策目標(biāo)，多邊貿(mào)易談判的結(jié)果是各成員國(guó)內(nèi)政策和世界貿(mào)易自由化進(jìn)程之間的平衡，這種平衡反映在各項(xiàng)規(guī)則和成員關(guān)稅減讓表以及服務(wù)貿(mào)易減讓表當(dāng)中，其中包含了各成員合法的管理政策和措施。說(shuō)的簡(jiǎn)單一點(diǎn)，世貿(mào)組織是一套通過(guò)談判形成的契約，我們依據(jù)契約的規(guī)定行事，契約之外，則是各自的自由空間。

Similarly, preamble of the US paper partially quoted the Marrakech Declaration of 1994, that the multilateral trading system should be “based upon open, market-oriented policies”. However, the paper intentionally omitted the rest part of sentence, which says “ (based upon ... ) and the commitments  set out in the Uruguay Round Agreements and  Decisions”. This second half sentence is extremely important, as each Member has its own domestic policy objectives, and that the results of multilateral negotiations are a balance between Member’s domestic policies and the process of global trade liberalization. Such balance is reflected in the trade rules, the tariff schedules and services schedules of Members, which contain descriptions of Members’ legitimate regulatory policies and measures. To put it simple, the WTO Agreement is a set of contracts achieved through negotiations. Within the scope of those contracts, Members abide by the conditions set forth in the contracts. Beyond the scope of those contracts, Members have their own policy space.

中國(guó)憲法第十六條對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)的自主經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)做了明確規(guī)定。美方文件花了大量筆墨試圖說(shuō)明政府對(duì)企業(yè)的“控制”， 但卻沒(méi)能提供政府干預(yù)企業(yè)正常經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)的證據(jù)。我曾就這個(gè)問(wèn)題與一位美國(guó)高級(jí)官員辯論，他也未能提供證據(jù)，最后他說(shuō)，控制不是科學(xué)而是藝術(shù)。話說(shuō)至此，辯論當(dāng)然無(wú)法繼續(xù)，但我在心里卻不能認(rèn)同成千上萬(wàn)的中國(guó)企業(yè)是由一群藝術(shù)家控制的觀點(diǎn)。在座的很多同事都清楚，美國(guó)真正的目的不只是想證明中國(guó)企業(yè)受政府控制，而且希望建立這樣一種邏輯關(guān)系，即因?yàn)槠髽I(yè)受控制，所以它們是履行政府職權(quán)的“公共機(jī)構(gòu)”，應(yīng)承擔(dān)相應(yīng)世貿(mào)組織協(xié)定比如補(bǔ)貼協(xié)定下的義務(wù)?？上?，這種邏輯被世貿(mào)組織上訴機(jī)構(gòu)駁回了。上訴機(jī)構(gòu)在 DS379 案的裁決中明確指出，“不能僅僅因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)實(shí)體的所有權(quán)性質(zhì)或者是否受政府控制來(lái)認(rèn)定該實(shí)體是公共機(jī)構(gòu)。” 我知道美國(guó)同事一直對(duì)輸?shù)暨@個(gè)官司耿耿于懷，但上訴機(jī)構(gòu)的裁決不容挑戰(zhàn)。

The Article 16 of China’s Constitution clearly states that state-owned enterprises have decision-making power over their operation and management. The US paper spends many paragraphs trying to argue that the Chinese government “controls” enterprises. But the paper  failed  to  provide evidence to prove that the government intervenes in the normal operation of the enterprises.  I once had a debate with a US senior official over this point. He later conceded that he was unable to provide evidence. At  the end of our debate, he said that control was not science, it  was an art.    With his such words, the debate was adjourned. But for me, I would not agree with the notion that thousands of  enterprises in China are controlled by a group of artists. It is known to many colleagues present today that the real purpose of the US is not only trying to prove that Chinese enterprises are controlled by the government, but also trying to establish kind of logic. That is, so long as enterprises are controlled by the government, they therefore assume and perform part of government functions and therefore should be deemed as “public bodies” in the context of WTO and should undertake obligations under the WTO agreements such as Subsidies and Countervailing Agreement. Unfortunately, such logic was overturned by the Appellate Body. In the US-China Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties case, the Appellate Body stated that “the mere ownership or control over an entity by a government, without more, is not sufficient to establish that the entity is a public body”. I was  told that our American colleagues have been quite unhappy with losing this case, but the ruling of the Appellate Body cannot be challenged.

讓我再舉一個(gè)例子，文件第一部分第 1.14 段，美國(guó)批評(píng)中國(guó)將“社會(huì)信用體系”作為“監(jiān)控在華企業(yè)的新工具”。而實(shí)際上中國(guó)探索建立社會(huì)信用體系是為了營(yíng)造公平誠(chéng)信的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境，中國(guó)的做法借鑒了德國(guó)、法國(guó)等 60 多個(gè)國(guó)家建立公共征信系統(tǒng)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。難道僅僅因?yàn)檫@個(gè)系統(tǒng)和美國(guó)的信用系統(tǒng)有所區(qū)別就成了控制企業(yè)的工具？

Let me give you another example.  In paragraph 1.14 of  the paper, the US questioned China for using “Social Credit System” as “new tool to monitor, rate and condition the conducts of all enterprises in China”. But the fact is that such a system is meant to create a fair and credible business environment and prevent fraud and misbehavior. And China’s “Social Credit System” is based on the experiences of over 60 countries that have established a similar public credit system, including in France and Germany. Is it simply because of its differences from that of the US that such system becomes a tool to monitor and control enterprises?

第二，評(píng)價(jià)政策性質(zhì)和影響的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)缺乏一致性。

Second, there lacks consistency in the standards used in assessing Members’ policies. 

發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家是產(chǎn)業(yè)政策和補(bǔ)貼的發(fā)明者和主要使用者。正是 18 世紀(jì)末美國(guó)漢密爾頓的《制造業(yè)報(bào)告》開(kāi)啟了制定產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的先河。今天美國(guó)的《先進(jìn)制造業(yè)伙伴計(jì)劃》（AMP）《信息高速公路計(jì)劃》（NII）等不就是美國(guó)的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策嗎？ 根據(jù)美國(guó)補(bǔ)貼監(jiān)控組織“好工作優(yōu)先”統(tǒng)計(jì)， 2000-2015 年這 15 年間，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦政府以撥款或者稅收抵免形式至少向企業(yè)補(bǔ)貼了 680 億美元。

The developed countries are inventors and major users of industrial policies and subsidies. It is actually Alexander Hamilton who pioneered the concept of industrial policies in his 1790 Report on Manufactures. Today, the US Advanced Manufacturing Partnership (AMP), the US National Information Infrastructure (NII), to name a few, are key industrial policies in the US. According to the Good Jobs  First,  a  US national policy resource center that tracks subsidies, the US federal government has allocated a total of 68 billion USD in the form of government grants and tax credits from year 2000 to 2015.

像其他國(guó)家一樣，中國(guó)也制訂了一些戰(zhàn)略、規(guī)劃和產(chǎn)業(yè)政策，在經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)發(fā)展中發(fā)揮了一定的作用，但在美國(guó)這份文件里，中國(guó)的規(guī)劃和產(chǎn)業(yè)政策成了無(wú)所不能的神器，這顯然是夸大其詞。如果真是那樣，各國(guó)就只要競(jìng)相制定產(chǎn)業(yè)政策文件就好了，根本不用花氣力提高生產(chǎn)能力。我做過(guò)商務(wù)部政策研究室主任，參與過(guò)一些規(guī)劃的制訂。不久前一位過(guò)去的同事來(lái)看我，他既有些疑惑又有些驚喜地對(duì)我說(shuō)，“以前常為自己參與的規(guī)劃實(shí)際影響有限感到沮喪，現(xiàn)在有人說(shuō)這些規(guī)劃改變了中國(guó)、震動(dòng)了世界，真沒(méi)想到自己有那么的厲害?！蔽覍?duì)他說(shuō)，“醒醒吧，人家拿你說(shuō)事呢?！?/span>

Like other countries, China also has developed some industrial policies for strategic and planning purposes. These policies have played certain role in China’s social and economic development. But in the US paper, these policies are described as rocket engines, which is plainly exaggerating. If that were  the case, there would be no need for any country to work hard and enhance their productive capacity, rather all countries can simply rush to draw up fancy industrial policies. In this regard I can share some personal experiences. Several years ago, I served as the Director General for  the Policy Research Department in the Ministry of Commerce and I had been involved in developing some plans. A former colleague from that Department recently visited me, saying with a bit of surprise and confusion that: “I used to feel frustrated quite often with the actual effect of the plans that I had joined in developing, but happily now some people are saying these plans had changed China and shocked the world.   I never realize that I myself and my plan can be so powerful.”  I said to him:  “Wake up, you should know better what those plans can do.”

第三，論據(jù)和論點(diǎn)之間沒(méi)有邏輯關(guān)系。

Third, there are missing links between evidences and arguments.

中國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)農(nóng)村部的屈冬玉副部長(zhǎng)是我的朋友，他本人是一位農(nóng)業(yè)科學(xué)家。不久前他來(lái)日內(nèi)瓦開(kāi)會(huì)，我問(wèn)他科學(xué)家說(shuō)話和一般人有什么區(qū)別，他說(shuō)可能會(huì)更具有描述性，因?yàn)榭茖W(xué)家不會(huì)輕易地下結(jié)論。我們不能按照科學(xué)家的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)要求所有人，但做出一項(xiàng)判斷時(shí)總不能過(guò)于草率。

 Mr. Qu Dongyu is Vice-Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs in China and also an agricultural scientist. He is my friend and came to Geneva a few weeks ago. When we met, I asked him what makes a scientist different from an ordinary person. He replied that you seldom hear a Yes or No answer from a scientist. They can talk a lot about facts in a descriptive manner, but they would be very cautious to give you any conclusions. Of course, we cannot use the scientists as a benchmark for everyone. But it is scientifically wise not to  draw hasty conclusions before making thorough analysis.

美方文件第二部分第 2.9 段的論點(diǎn)是中國(guó)的計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)越來(lái)越多，使用的證據(jù)是有多達(dá)幾千家的機(jī)構(gòu)參與了產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的制定過(guò)程。在我看來(lái)，這個(gè)論據(jù)只能說(shuō)明中國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)政策是在廣泛征求意見(jiàn)基礎(chǔ)上制定的，是公開(kāi)透明的。

Let us get back to the US paper, the Paragraph 2.9 argues that China’s planned economy “has become more, not less salient over the past 20 years”. The evidence used to support  this argument is that thousands of agencies participate in planning industrial policies. To me, these facts only prove that the mechanism for setting industrial policies has become more open and transparent, that government agencies making policies increasingly rely on extensive consultations with stakeholders.

文件第四部分“中國(guó)從其經(jīng)濟(jì)模式中受益”有幾處使用了正確的事實(shí)，比如“中國(guó)抓住了加入世貿(mào)組織的機(jī)會(huì)快速發(fā)展了自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)”，還有，中國(guó)制造業(yè)成本低廉的原因是“規(guī)模效應(yīng)和更先進(jìn)的供應(yīng)鏈”。但從這些事實(shí)，一下跳到了質(zhì)疑中國(guó)發(fā)展中國(guó)家身份，并指責(zé)中國(guó)“拒絕為全球貿(mào)易自由化做貢獻(xiàn)”的結(jié)論，中間沒(méi)有任何因果分析，也讓人根本看不出美國(guó)似乎想說(shuō)明的中國(guó)是如何“利用發(fā)展中國(guó)家身份”獲益的。所有的國(guó)家加入世貿(mào)組織都是為了發(fā)展自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)，這也是《世貿(mào)組織協(xié)定》序言中確定的宗旨。中國(guó)之所以能夠?yàn)槿?球發(fā)展做出貢獻(xiàn)，恰恰因?yàn)橐环矫嬷铝τ谧陨斫?jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，另一方面致力于與其他國(guó)家分享發(fā)展機(jī)遇。

In section 4 of the US paper, entitled “Benefits to China of its economic model”, the US pointed to several facts, such as “China has seized on the benefits of WTO membership to rapidly develop its economy” and the lower cost of China’s manufacturing owes to “economies of scale and more advanced supply-chain development”. But from these facts, this section jumps to questioning China’s status as a developing country and criticizing China as exempting itself from contributing to liberalization of global trade rules, without providing any cause and  effect  analysis. It is hard to see how China’s development has benefited from its developing country status. All countries and regions join the WTO with a view to developing their economies, and that principle was stated in the Preamble of the WTO Agreement. The reason why China has been able to make contribution to the global development is precisely because that we have achieved growth through developing our own economy, and more importantly, sharing  the opportunities and benefits with the rest of the world.

第四，論據(jù)的選擇和使用缺乏嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)膽B(tài)度。

Fourth, there are lack of seriousness in selecting and using evidences.

我不僅讀了美方文件的正文部分，也看了它的 88 個(gè)腳注，有些腳注里的內(nèi)容現(xiàn)在還沒(méi)找到。我的同事說(shuō)也許因?yàn)槲沂蔷扌纷?，所以特別關(guān)注細(xì)節(jié)。但這里的每一個(gè)人都知道魔鬼在細(xì)節(jié)里。一份文件如果腳注有問(wèn)題，論據(jù)就靠不住，論點(diǎn)就值得懷疑。請(qǐng)讓我分享幾個(gè)發(fā)現(xiàn)：

I have read very carefully the US paper, not only its main part, but also the 88 footnotes. For some footnotes, I could not find the sources as referred. My colleagues were saying that because I was born in June and I am a Cancer in the Zodiac, so I often pay too much attention to the details. But as we all know, the devil is in the details. If a paper has flaws in its footnote,  then its evidence may be called into question and its arguments will be put into doubt. Let me share a few.

文件第一部分第 1.3 段稱中國(guó)限制市場(chǎng)力量發(fā)揮作用，其依據(jù)是腳注 2 的中國(guó)《物權(quán)法》，而《物權(quán)法》明明規(guī)定“支持、鼓勵(lì)、引導(dǎo)”非公有制發(fā)展。為什么在美國(guó)同事的眼里，“支持、鼓勵(lì)、引導(dǎo)”卻等同于打壓、限制和干擾呢？

Paragraph 1.3 of the paper says that China limits the power of the market and cites in its footnote China’s Property Law as a source. But the fact is that the Property Law clearly says that China “encourages, supports and guides the development of the non-public economy.” I wonder why in the eyes of our US colleagues, the very words “encourage, support and guide” could be misread as “suppress, limit and intervene”.

文件第三部分“非互惠和封閉的市場(chǎng)”這一節(jié)和其他部分有個(gè)不同之處，三段文字竟然沒(méi)有一個(gè)腳注。我想可能是不太好找吧，與此結(jié)論相反的腳注卻很容易找，我忍不住想幫忙提供幾個(gè)：2017 年中國(guó)對(duì)世界經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的貢獻(xiàn)率為 34%。中國(guó)是 120 多個(gè)國(guó)家和地區(qū)的最大貿(mào)易伙伴。這樣的例子在中國(guó)剛剛向總理事會(huì)提交的《中國(guó)與世貿(mào)組織白皮書(shū)》（WT/GC/W/749）中隨處可見(jiàn)。還有，謝伊大使擔(dān)任美中經(jīng)濟(jì)與安全審查委員會(huì)副主席時(shí)聯(lián)合簽署的委員會(huì)  2013 年度報(bào)告指出，“中國(guó)航空航天、汽車工業(yè)和農(nóng)產(chǎn)品等行業(yè)的需求增長(zhǎng)支撐了美國(guó)出口”。如果中國(guó)是一個(gè)非互惠和封閉的市場(chǎng)，美國(guó)產(chǎn)品是怎進(jìn)去的呢？

Section 3A of the paper is entitled “non-reciprocal and protected market” of China. But one particularity over this section is that it has not a single footnote. I presume it is difficult to find evidence that can support this argument. However, if we reverse the argument, we can find plenty of evidences. Let me just offer a few. In 2017, China’s  contribution to the growth of the world economy is 34%. China is the largest trading partner for over 120 countries and regions. There are plenty more such evidences in the white paper on China and the World Trade Organization that China has recently submitted to the General Council in the document WT/GC/W/749.The 2013 Report to Congress of the US-CHINA Economic and Security Review Commission co-signed by Ambassador Shea stated that “growing demand from China has supported American exports in certain sectors of the US economy, such as aerospace, the auto industry and agricultural products”. If China had been a “non-reciprocal and protected market”, how did those US products enter the Chinese market?

對(duì)文件 3.5 段產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩這部分，我也愿意貢獻(xiàn)一個(gè)腳注。圣加倫大學(xué)教授伊文尼特（Simon Evenett）5月3日發(fā)表了一篇文章《不要對(duì)制造業(yè)產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩問(wèn)題惱羞成怒》，里面提到中國(guó)對(duì)G20 成員出口產(chǎn)品的86%都不是來(lái)自所謂的產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩行業(yè)。他所參與的全球貿(mào)易預(yù)警（Global Trade Alert）項(xiàng)目對(duì) 16 家中國(guó)和 31 家其他國(guó)家的上市鋼鐵公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告進(jìn)行了研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)中國(guó)公司獲得的補(bǔ)貼占銷售收入的比例只有不到 0.4%，而很多其他國(guó)家公司獲得的補(bǔ)貼比這高得多。

I would also like to contribute a footnote to paragraph 3.5 on excess capacity. On 3 May, Professor Simon Evenett published an article entitled “Don’t go spare over excess capacity in manufactures”, which provided that 86% of China’s exports to the G20 countries are not coming from the so-called sectors with excess capacity. The Global Trade Alert that he runs has examined financial reports of 16 Chinese and 31 non-Chinese listed steel companies. The figures show that subsidies only accounted for less than 0.4% of sales revenue of the Chinese steel companies, while for many non-Chinese steel companies, that share is much higher.

主席先生，我想我應(yīng)該結(jié)束對(duì)美方文件的評(píng)論了。對(duì)美方提交的另一份文件《2017 年中國(guó)履行世貿(mào)組織承諾報(bào)告》，我想我已經(jīng)沒(méi)有必要再去評(píng)論了。對(duì)于我剛剛評(píng)論的這份文件，我為參加起草的美國(guó)貿(mào)易代表辦公室的同事感到難過(guò)，我對(duì)他們很尊重，我指出其中存在的部分問(wèn)題是為了澄清事實(shí)，改進(jìn)批評(píng)的質(zhì)量。我當(dāng)然知道這和他們的專業(yè)水平和努力程度沒(méi)有關(guān)系。誰(shuí)都明白，先入為主，寫(xiě)出來(lái)的東西必然有失水準(zhǔn)。

Mr. Chairman. For comment on the US paper, maybe I should stop here. As for the other submission by the US, which is the 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, I believe there is no need for me to comment on it. I feel a bit sorry for our USTR colleagues who have worked so hard to produce these documents. In fact, I quite respect them though. The reason  why I have identified some questions in their submissions is to help them improve the quality of their criticism. I  know for  sure that this has nothing to do with their professionalism and diligence. But we all know if we start writing with a  preoccupied viewpoint, then the paper’s quality will be less than our expectation.

中國(guó)古代有個(gè)三人成虎的故事，不存在的事實(shí)說(shuō)的次數(shù)多了就有人相信，扣帽子的人也許正希望產(chǎn)生這種效果吧。但我認(rèn)為很可能會(huì)事與愿違，由中國(guó)《戰(zhàn)國(guó)策》里的搖唇鼓舌者變成《伊索寓言》里喊“狼來(lái)了”的放羊娃。因?yàn)槭聦?shí)和真相終歸無(wú)法掩蓋和改變。我對(duì)媒體說(shuō)過(guò)，有人批評(píng)中國(guó)是重商主義者，可是你見(jiàn)過(guò)主動(dòng)降低關(guān)稅的重商主義者嗎？你見(jiàn)過(guò)組織進(jìn)口博覽會(huì)鼓勵(lì)進(jìn)口的重商主義者嗎？

In China we have an old saying that it only takes three people to make you believe there is a tiger around. The story runs like this. One day, someone told the Emperor that there  was a tiger rambling around the Capital. The Emperor did not believe him. Later in the day, another person told the Emperor the same thing. He still did not believe it. But when the  Emperor heard the same story from a third person, he ordered his generals to go out and hunt for the tiger. This story tells us that a fiction repeated enough times may become a belief. This is maybe the anticipated results wanted by those who are labeling others. I do not think they have a bigger chance of success, as this may work the opposite way in that those who are labeling others will change from the hired agents in the Strategies of the Warring States to the boy who cried wolf in the Aesop's Fables.  This is because the facts and truth can never   be covered or altered. As I said in a recent interview, someone criticized China as a Mercantilist country, but have you ever seen a Mercantilist country that cuts tariff voluntarily? Have  you ever seen a mercantilist country that hosts an International Import Expo to increase import from around the world? 

大家都清楚，在目前世貿(mào)組織面臨的空前挑戰(zhàn)中，哪個(gè)國(guó)家的貿(mào)易政策才是真正具有破壞性的。以國(guó)家安全為借口限制鋁和鋼鐵貿(mào)易的“232條款”措施和以國(guó)內(nèi)法為依據(jù)單方面提高關(guān)稅的“301條款”措施，如果拿剛剛結(jié)束的世界杯足球賽做比喻，這些措施顯然都屬嚴(yán)重犯規(guī)，應(yīng)受紅牌處罰，而此時(shí)美國(guó)還在阻撓上訴機(jī)構(gòu)成員作為裁判上場(chǎng)執(zhí)法。 

 Currently, the WTO is facing the unprecedented challenges. We have to be fully aware which country’s trade measures are most disruptive. How disruptive are the Section 232 measures that restrict import of steel and aluminum using national security as a pretext? How disruptive are the Section 301 measures that unilaterally impose tariffs on imports?  If  compared  to  the FIFA World Cup, these measures have severely undermined the rules of game and deserve a couple of red cards.  What is   worse, the US is blocking the referees from performing their duties by obstructing the reappointment of the Appellate Body members. 

前面提到，我并不太在乎批評(píng)者的態(tài)度，即使是不負(fù)責(zé)任的指責(zé)和攻擊，也可以一笑置之。過(guò)去挨打，使上幾輩中國(guó)人發(fā)奮圖強(qiáng)；現(xiàn)在挨罵，讓這一代中國(guó)人頭腦清醒。而對(duì)于世貿(mào)組織來(lái)說(shuō)，要找到解決成員分歧的方式必須通過(guò)平等協(xié)商，就問(wèn)題的根源、性質(zhì)、影響及與世貿(mào)組織規(guī)則的關(guān)系達(dá)成一致，施壓、抹黑、妖魔化都無(wú)濟(jì)于事。

 As mentioned in the beginning, I have an open mind for criticisms, even if they maybe unjust attack and not in good faith. We  may just laugh it off.  For China, holding our feet to the   fire never worked. In the past, external pressure only made a nation of generations of hard working people striving for a purpose. And for now, criticisms help us to keep a cool head while moving forward. For the WTO, the only way to resolve differences is through consultations on equal footing, to find out about the root cause, the nature and implications of the problems and explore their relationship with the WTO rules. Extortion, distortion or demonization does no good to resolve the issues.

我們從未否認(rèn)過(guò)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制中存在的問(wèn)題，中國(guó)進(jìn)入了改革的深水區(qū)，我們的工作還存在許多不足，也面臨不少困難和挑戰(zhàn)，對(duì)有益的批評(píng)和建議我們求之不得，如饑似渴。在對(duì)華貿(mào)易政策審議中，很多成員向中國(guó)提出了建設(shè)性的意見(jiàn)和建議。在座的同事都聽(tīng)了瑞士大使尚博文（ Didier  Chambovey）先生作為引導(dǎo)人的評(píng)論，我認(rèn)為他的評(píng)論是建立在深入考察、客觀分析基礎(chǔ)之上的真知灼見(jiàn)。他給我印象最深的一句話是，“世貿(mào)組織成員具有多樣性，有著各自不同的經(jīng)濟(jì)模式，有著各自不同的管理貿(mào)易投資的框架。但在這種多樣性當(dāng)中，有一種共同的東西，即大家都相信市場(chǎng)的力量，盡管程度有所不同。”他指出的從高速度轉(zhuǎn)向高質(zhì)量發(fā)展和處理好市場(chǎng)與政府作用關(guān)系方面中國(guó)所面臨的諸多挑戰(zhàn)，正是我們今后改革的重點(diǎn)。對(duì)于這種中肯的意見(jiàn)，我們會(huì)心悅誠(chéng)服地接受。對(duì)于這種以嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)膽B(tài)度提出批評(píng)意見(jiàn)的人，我們?cè)敢獍阉麄儺?dāng)作我們的先生，隨時(shí)向他們請(qǐng)教。

We have never denied that there are problems in China’s economic system, and China’s reform is entering into the deep water zones.  We face many challenges and there are much  more to be done. We readily welcome the constructive criticisms and suggestions, which we are more than happy to consider.  In the Trade Policy Review of China two weeks ago, many Members provided constructive comments and  suggestions.  We have all heard the comments by H.E. Ambassador Didier Chambovey of the Switzerland as discussant in China’s TPR. I commend him on his statement as it is based on in-depth insight and objective analysis. For me, the most impressive sentence from his concluding remarks is this: “Membership at the WTO is multifaceted. We all have different types of economic models, differing frameworks for trade and investment. Yet at the centre of this diverse universe is a more or less common belief in the virtues of market forces.” Ambassador Chambovey rightly pointed out that in the transition from huge quantity to high quality, and in properly handling the relationship between the government and the market, China still has many challenges to overcome. And this is exactly the priority for China’s future reform. With regard to such good faith and objective opinion, we would accept wholeheartedly.  And those who kindly give  us good faith and just comments, we would regard them as our teachers and learn from them constantly.

聽(tīng)了其他成員的發(fā)言和謝伊大使的第二輪發(fā)言，我覺(jué)得有必要對(duì)我剛才講的做一個(gè)小結(jié)。評(píng)論其他成員的經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易政策及其與世貿(mào)組織的關(guān)系，我認(rèn)為批評(píng)者應(yīng)具有自省精神和邊界意識(shí)。

Having listened to the interventions of other members and the second intervention by Ambassador Shea, I think I need to make a recap. Members can of course comment on other member’s economic policies and their relationship with the WTO, but to do that, I think we should have the courage to look first into ourselves and also have a sense of where the border line is.

孔子說(shuō)過(guò)“不遷怒”。不能因?yàn)樽约旱膯?wèn)題沖別人發(fā)火。任何所謂的結(jié)構(gòu)性問(wèn)題歸根到底都是國(guó)內(nèi)問(wèn)題。例如，不解決美國(guó)儲(chǔ)蓄率低的問(wèn)題，貿(mào)易逆差是不可能根本解決的。在批評(píng)別人的時(shí)候不要忘記自己是怎么走過(guò)來(lái)的，像發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家一樣，發(fā)展中國(guó)家保護(hù)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)水平的提高需要一個(gè)過(guò)程，發(fā)展中國(guó)家也需要通過(guò)制定產(chǎn)業(yè)政策幫助實(shí)現(xiàn)工業(yè)化，像巴基斯坦的沙淘奇 (Tauqir Shah)大使說(shuō)的不能做過(guò)河拆橋、上房抽梯的事。

Confucius said that we should not vent our anger on others, or blame others for our own failure. We all know that at the end of the day, all structural issues are domestic issues. For instance, if the US does not increase its savings rate, it’s unlikely that it can solve its problem of trade deficit. Before criticizing others, we should think twice if we have done similar things in the past. Like developed counties done in the past, today’s developing countries also need time to enhance their protection of intellectual property right, or develop their industries through strategic planning and policies. As Ambassador Tauqir Shah said during China’s TPR, we cannot burn the bridge after crossing the river.

老子說(shuō)過(guò)“知止不殆”。世貿(mào)組織的職責(zé)和我們的能力是有限的。我們應(yīng)當(dāng)聚焦那些成員普遍關(guān)注并且能夠取得進(jìn)展的領(lǐng)域，而不要做那些世貿(mào)組織管不著、管不了和我們自己力所不逮的事情。

Laozi, the founder of Taoism, said if you know when to stop, you’ll not face danger. There’re boundaries to both WTO’s functions and our capacities. We should focus on those areas where members have shared concerns and could potentially make progress. We should not get ourselves into debating issues that are beyond the realm of the WTO and beyond our capacities.

我們當(dāng)然應(yīng)該考慮世貿(mào)組織的未來(lái)，研究如何使多邊貿(mào)易體制適應(yīng)全球化的變化，在此方面中國(guó)愿意發(fā)揮建設(shè)性的作用，做出自己的貢獻(xiàn)。但是，世貿(mào)組織的當(dāng)務(wù)之急，是制止單邊主義和保護(hù)主義的蔓延，讓爭(zhēng)端解決機(jī)制恢復(fù)正常運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，讓貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)盡快停下來(lái)，而不是轉(zhuǎn)移視線和尋找替罪羊。

That being said, for sure we need to think about the future of the WTO, and explore how to make the multilateral system compatible with the changes in the globalization. China is willing to play a constructive role and make its contribution. However, at the present moment, the paramount task for the WTO is to curb the spread of unilateralism and protectionism, to bring the dispute settlement to its full function and to stop the trade war. We should not waste our time finding scapegoats or look away from these fundamental challenges.

謝謝主席先生。

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.